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For the last five centuries, nation-states have excelled in the art of  war, 
showing an extraordinary capability to create military organizations that 
guaranteed sufficient obedience and were thus compatible with their own 
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For the last five centuries, nation-states have excelled in the art of  war, thanks 
to the help of  capitalism. Politics assumed the responsibility of  determining whom 
to kill and why, of  finding the ‘just cause’ for war. The market, on the other hand, 
occupied itself  with supplying the instruments of  slaughter. It is like saying that for 
centuries war has carried out a political, and therefore, public, function; but that 
private actors have always claimed wide margins of  manoeuvre, and profit, in all the 
activities connected to its management.
The end of  the Cold War, together with the ongoing globalization processes, 
mark an unprecedented cleavage with the past: the public-private divide tends to be 
blurred. The ‘retreat of  the state’ favors the triumph of  the global market of  war, 
which in turns fosters an increase in civil conflicts and an unprecedented prolifera-
tion of  violent non-state actors (VNSAs), competing and conflicting among them-
selves and with the state for the control of  urban environments.
This evolution is redefining the very concept of  war, bringing back the city at 
the center of  the political conflict; and paving the way for the vindication of  a new 
wave of  urban militarism and hegemonic (in)stability.
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foundations of  legitimacy. It is not a coincidence that absolute monarchs, 
whose power derived from God or tradition, demonstrated a marked pre-
dilection for mercenary troops and, when finances and the consolidation 
of  the bureaucracies made it possible, for armies composed of  professional 
soldiers. In the same way, only a revolutionary regime such as that of  1792 
in France could have conceived of  the idea of  the nation armée and resort 
to mass conscription without fearing for its own survival as a political en-
tity. This historical cycle reached its apex during the total wars of  the early 
twentieth century, which saw the citizens of  belligerent states involved first 
as soldiers and then in their capacity as civilians as well, as the targets of  
‘terror bombings’ in the cities. After that, the USA and the USSR in par-
ticular engaged in the development of  the largest arsenal in human history, 
accumulating thermonuclear arms whose use was limited (thankfully for 
all involved) to strategy simulations or war games. The two superpowers 
certainly did not remain inactive, but rather utilized their immense con-
ventional military resources in wars against third parties, or to feed proxy 
wars entrusted to their allies on the periphery of  the international system.
Over this same centuries, none of  this would have been possible if  the 
nation-state had not been able to count on the help of  capitalism. The evo-
lution of  military apparatus in the political sphere requires a similar ca-
pacity for innovation in the economic sphere: from the production and 
sale of  weapons, to the collection and allocation of  capital. Even with re-
gard to war, the historical vicissitudes of  the state and capitalism appear 
in reality to be inseparable. It is enough to reflect on the age of  the first 
great transoceanic enterprises, when long distance trade in precious metals 
developed in order to satisfy the growing needs of  powers such as Spain; 
or the later colonial adventures of  England, France, and the Netherlands, 
when it seemed instead that it was the governments placing themselves at 
the service of  private interests.
Politics assumes the responsibility of  determining who will be killed 
and why, of  finding the ‘just cause’ for war – from the civilizing mission 
of  colonialism to the global war on terrorism. The market, on the other 
hand, occupies itself  with supplying the instruments of  slaughter. It is like 
saying that for centuries war has carried out a political, and therefore, pub-
lic, function; but that private actors have always claimed wide margins of  
manoeuvre, and profit, in all the activities connected to its management.
1. The Enduring Clausewitz
The year 1989 marks an unprecedented cleavage with the past. First of  
all, f rom the point of  view of  the international system, which has strug-
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gled since then to establish new rules of  conduct and clear hierarchies. 
The fall of  the Soviet Union deprives the American administration of  an 
enemy which, on an international level, had actually revealed itself  to be 
an excellent governing partner. The two superpowers had succeeded, in 
fact, in constructing a vast network of  patron-client relationships that al-
lowed developing countries in particular to play their changing positions 
between the two blocks like a card for procuring ever greater resources. 
The immediate dismantling of  that network compromises the US capacity 
for leadership, and its pretense to continue to exercise authority over the 
entire planet. At least until the appearance of  a new enemy gives new life 
to the strategy of  alliance.
However, 1989 marks an even more significant cleavage in the relation-
ship between politics and the market. The previously mentioned anomaly 
of  the Cold War – the fact that confrontation cannot go beyond the thresh-
old of  the rhetoric of  deterrence without risking the extermination of  the 
human race – shifts the competition from the military plane to the tech-
nological and industrial planes. And therefore the primary beneficiary is an 
economic system rather than a political system. 1989 owes far more to the 
competitive nature of  American capitalism – author of  the failure of  the 
planned economy of  the Soviet state – than to the penetration of  demo-
cratic values. This is further demonstrated by the fact that, while capitalism 
has not encountered obstacles to its own expansion since then, in many 
countries (and not only in those of  the former Soviet block) democracy 
is a conquest more in form than in substance. Actually, capitalism has es-
tablished itself  often to the detriment of  democracy, imposing extremely 
elevated social costs to a growing multitude of  men and women.
In other words, the fall of  the Berlin Wall liberated the forces of  capital-
ism from the geopolitical restraints that characterized the Cold War era. 
As if  the bulwarks had suddenly given way, the free market flooded into 
eastern Europe, Russia, even China, washing away previously existing in-
stitutions or, at the least, subjecting them to its own uses. In the course of  
just a few years, the expansion of  the free market accomplished a feat that 
overshadows, for the rapidity with which it was realized and for the vast 
number of  countries involved, the numerous efforts at conquest which 
until then had characterized the history of  capitalism. Furthermore, as a 
consequence of  that event, states began to rethink their own role, launch-
ing a process of  privatization that involved a growing number of  sectors 
which until then had been under public management  – from education 
to healthcare to the armed forces. That choice, meant as a remedy to help 
bring down growing budget deficits, ended up calling into question the 
very idea of  democracy as a mechanism for the redistribution of  resources, 
heightening the inequalities instead of  diminishing them (Armao 2015).
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With regard to war, in particular, this privatization process has resulted 
in the freeing up of  growing spaces for new violent non-state actors (VN-
SAs). Actors that seemed to have been relegated to the past now begin to 
recapture substantial segments of  warfare arena. Mercenarism is a com-
mon practice in many wars where even children are forced to fight, on the 
African continent, in some Asian peripheries, and in Latin America; and 
piracy has made a comeback as a lucrative activity, especially in Asia and 
the Pacific.
The reappearance on the world scene of  these kind of  players, state 
rivals with respect to the use of  violence – and, more recently, of  groups 
such as mafias, terrorist networks, and military corporations – seems des-
tined to contradict the universalist character of  the state experience which 
is generally taken for granted. The fact that there is no place left on earth 
which is not part of  one state or another, promoted the idea of  a world 
that was fairly stable or that, at the least, had completed a necessary and 
decisive phase of  its consolidation. And the slow, but constant progress in 
the number of  democratic regimes, the end of  the clashes between rival 
ideologies, the globalization of  the economy, all contributed to strength-
ening this idea. The observation that between those same states the incli-
nation towards preferring the instruments of  law was gaining strength, as 
witnessed by an ever tighter network of  international organizations, also 
seemed to confirm that within a short time violence would be confined 
to residual areas of  the planet where, in the end, war itself  would finally 
cede its place to the more moderate use of  force by ‘international police 
corps’.
Many authors interpret this evolution as a return to the state of  na-
ture. According to them, even within many nation-states the very premises 
of  civil coexistence, and in particular, that pactum subiectionis upon which 
rests the sovereign authority’s claim to a legitimate monopoly on the use 
of  force, seem to be questioned anew. The lexicon of  political science was 
enriched by expressions such as ‘failed state’ and ‘rogue state’; and there 
are even those who theorize the return to fealty and organizing principles 
of  feudalism.1
Opposing this idea of  a return to an original pre-political condition, we 
assume on the contrary that new wars are the product of  the blurring of  
1 Post-89 saw a rebirth of  feudal studies, both in a theoretical mood – neo-medievalism 
as a paradigm capable to combine the ostensible contradiction between globalization pro-
cesses and state sovereignty (Friedrichs 2001) – and in empirical terms – neo-feudalism as a 
way to interpret the consequences of  globalization on agriculture in Chile (Murray 2006) or 
in Australia (Davidson and Grant 2001), or the spreading of  neo-conservatism in the USA 
(Zafirovski 2007).
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the public-private divide. Going back again to history, we could observe in 
fact that, particularly in Europe, the exit from the feudal system and the 
entire state-building process can be resumed in terms of  the pretense of  the 
monarchies to gradually enlarge their sources of  legitimacy, and to define 
themselves (also against other competing political authorities) in terms of  
the legitimate holders of  the monopoly in the use of  force. This process 
entailed the creation of  a certain, limited, number of  public spaces of  sov-
ereignty – the nation-states, with their own armed forces and police appa-
ratuses – and also a gradual ban on private violent actors, such as merce-
naries, pirates, and so on (Tilly 1975 and 1990). We assume that the end of  
the Cold War, together with the ongoing globalization processes, inverted 
this process, and that the public-private border is now again blurred. As a 
consequence, the internal and external factors also are blurred. The “new 
wars” (Kaldor 2012) are both local and global, and they are different from 
both classic inter-state wars and classic civil wars.
It is worth stressing this main point: the post-Cold war period was, and 
still is, characterized by both the recurrence of  state wars and the spread 
of  forms of  organized violence other than wars. Asymmetric warfare be-
tween alliances led by the USA and failed states, such as those witnessed 
in Afghanistan and Iraq, coexist alongside civil wars, such as that of  for-
mer Yugoslavia; and other conflicts managed by ethnic or terrorist groups, 
gangs, and narcotraffickers, among others. The massive military-industrial 
complexes conceived in the context of  the threat of  nuclear Armageddon 
are still there of  course, but they now coexist with irregular armies of  in-
surgents capable of  carrying out massacres through the use of  light weap-
ons and improvised explosive devices.
In sum, it is absolutely correct to assert that “new wars have a logic that 
is different from the logic of  [the] ‘old wars’ – the idea of  war that predomi-
nated in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries”, because in the new era 
of  globalization “the distinction between state and non-state, public and 
private, external and internal, economic and political, and even war and 
peace are breaking down” (Kaldor 2013: 2). At the same time, however, it 
seems equally legitimate to state that we still live in a Clausewitzian era, if  
we only remember this nowadays rarely quoted and yet fundamental cita-
tion: “we see, therefore, that war is not merely an act of  policy but a true 
political instrument, a continuation of  political intercourse carried on with 
other means. What remains peculiar to war is simply the peculiar nature of  
its means” [Clausewitz 1976 (1832): 87]. The privatization of  war, in fact, 
is a consequence of  the privatization of  politics  – of  the “retreat of  the 
state” (Strange 1996), increasingly eager to reduce the burdens associated 
to welfare and to privatize public sectors (including institutions holding the 
monopoly of  the legitimate use of  force).
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2. Bringing the City Back in
The 1989 cleavage, therefore, also fostered an increase in civil conflicts 
and an unprecedented proliferation of  VNSAs (terrorists, gangs, warlords 
and contractors); and a constant growth in social inequalities, both within 
individual countries and at the global level – a data in outright contradiction 
with the increase in the number of  democracies (Somaini 2009). Above all, 
however, 1989 produced a rescaling of  authorities, bringing cities back to 
the centre of  the political universe (Sassen 2007; Brenner 2004).
This renewed political protagonism of  the city is redefining the very 
meaning of  urban security. Going back to history, it is easy to note how cit-
ies have always been a favoured target of  wars: f rom the sieges of  ancient 
times and the medieval world, to the terrorist bombings of  World War II 
(Graham 2004; Coward 2009). The fate of  both war and guerrilla warfare 
is linked to the conquest of  the capital city and its locations of  political and 
financial power, as well as the fate of  the coups d’état. We could remember 
the entrance of  the Vietcong in Saigon on April 30 1975, or of  the Sand-
inista troops in Managua on July 19 1979; the attack on the Palacio de la 
Moneda in Santiago by Chilean military leaders on 11 September 1973, or 
the repeated occupation of  the Casa Rosada in Buenos Aires by Argentin-
ian armed forces. In times of  peace, the city has had to defend itself  f rom 
an endless series of  threats: f rom street crime, to social disorder and ter-
rorist attacks (Moser 2004; Agostini, Chianese, French and Sandhu 2010).
In the long process of  state- and nation-building, from the sixteenth 
century on, the state adopted the main role of  guaranteeing the security 
of  its citizens monopolizing the legitimate use of  force, while the city, cur-
tailed in its political prerogatives, was entrusted with the main task of  the 
accumulation of  capital (Tilly 1990). What changes with 1989, and with 
the following rescaling of  authorities, is that the city turns out to be more 
and more frequently a place where VNSAs compete and conflict among 
themselves and with the state for the control of  territory – and not only in 
the Global South of  the world.
Until now, social sciences have devoted most of  their attention, on one 
side, to the abstractions of  the globalization processes, on the other, to the 
empirical evidences of  violence, on the contrary relegating to the back-
ground the role of  the territory as such, and the triggering of  the competi-
tion for its control. It seems that researchers forgot that the nation-state 
itself  was born from a similar competition for the control of  the territory 
won at first, and not by chance, by sedentary bandits over nomadic ones 
(Olson 2000); and later, among the sedentary bandits, by those capable of  
gaining a higher “protection rent” and, as a consequence, to reinforce their 
sources of  legitimacy (Lane 1979).
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The traditional state-centric perspective prevented social science schol-
ars from fully grasping the great transformations in the security domain 
after the end of  the Cold War (Davis D.E. 2003). In a world where the state 
is no longer the only possible political and social benchmark, the first prob-
lem is tracing the borders of  the various “imagined communities” (Ander-
son 2006) of  each of  the old and new political spheres of  allegiance and 
reciprocity (Davis D.E. 2009). The head of  a government, the leader of  a 
group of  rebels or a gang, the boss of  a mafia clan or a cartel of  drug traf-
fickers all aim at gaining loyalty (or at least compliance) of  the individuals 
living in their territory; but the identities that they grant to their subjects 
are different, as are the forms and shares of  coercion that they use, and the 
welfare models that they are able to propose.
Since the nineteenth century, the idea of  nation proved to be the best 
way to convey the sense of  belonging to a social community. This idea 
allowed us to clearly draw the borders between the internal space of  le-
gitimacy of  a sovereign authority and the external space occupied by other 
states. The war was, typically, the time when these borders were crossed; 
while peace intervened to re-establish order, redesigning the hierarchies 
of  power or restoring the previous status quo. The proliferation of  imag-
ined communities, and the correlated privatization of  organized violence 
generate a much more fluid territoriality and, with it, a relentless prolifera-
tion of  contended spaces and no-man’s land, both among states and within 
them. Sovereignty is no longer exclusively organized on a state-by-state 
basis (Brown 2010); it ceases to be an absolute prerogative of  the state, to 
become a shared and divided resource within specific regions (sometimes 
trans-border) or even in the suburbs: “effective sovereignty is not necessar-
ily predicated on and defined by the strict and fixed territorial boundaries 
of  individual states” (Agnew 2009: 438).
In cities, mafias and gangs transform some neighborhoods into junc-
tures of  strategic importance, as much f rom the political perspective of  
the effective exercise of  coercive power and the maintaining of  a certain 
degree of  social cohesion, as f rom the economic point of  view of  the 
management of  the traffic of  illegal goods. Even more than the state-level 
dimension, the urban sphere also highlights a second aspect of  these new 
imagined communities: their transnational character. Terrorists, mafia 
and gang members follow the migratory flows created by globalization, 
projecting themselves f rom the peripheries (developing countries) to-
ward the centers of  the world capitalist economy (developed countries), 
and maintaining their identity and their sense of  belonging to the group. 
Their first task is to subjugate the members of  their own community of  
origin, and shape the new environment to serve their own needs (Armao 
2000 and 2014).
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In fact, each of  these groups – political if  and when it proves to be ca-
pable of  effectively competing for the monopoly of  coercion in a certain 
territory, however limited – increasingly tends to operate like a company 
within a cluster, developing systemic relationships with other companies 
operating in its area of  settlement (Porter 1990; Fujita, Krugman and Ven-
ables 1999). And just as some industrial clusters branch out beyond the 
national borders, some of  these new political clusters cooperate and com-
pete on the global level, proposing in fact a further challenge to the tradi-
tional prerogatives of  the state (Wixted 2009; Pitelis, Sugden and Wilson 
2006). Going on with this analogy, it is easy to ascertain how, within a 
specific geographical space, different clusters of  sovereignty may be forced 
to cohabit, and sometimes conflict. In terms of  physical, military, control 
of  a particular territory, the traditional state often becomes just one of  
many clusters laying claim to a portion of  the coercive power exercised by 
all the violent actors present in a given area (and the state may not even 
represent the most successful of  these contenders). This is true both for 
the so-called failed states, in which the government in charge in the capi-
tal competes with ethnic clans, liberation movements, warlords or sim-
ple criminals in a daily struggle for the control of  territory; and for those 
democratic regimes that are incapable of  guaranteeing the minimum re-
quirements of  citizenship in various zones, large and small, of  their own 
national territory.
3. Outlines of a New Militarism
One of  the factors that has certainly contributed to bridging the gap 
between public and private managers of  collective violence has been the 
democratic regimes’ gradual abandonment of  the universal draft. Among 
Western nations, the process of  abolishing the draft started in the middle 
of  the Cold War and has not yet concluded.2 In some cases it appeared to 
have been taken in the absence of  any real debate about its potential im-
plications, and yet the choice was entirely in keeping with what seemed to 
be the dominant aspects of  the new millennium: the end of  the ideologi-
2 Great Britain abolished National Service in 1960 with the definitive extinguishment of  
any imperial ambition (the Suez Canal episode dates back to 1956); and the US did the same in 
1973 as a result of  the Vietnam experience, marked by the birth of  a genuine collective move-
ment of  draft resistance. In other European countries the decision came much later: France 
and Spain, for example, abolished the universal draft in 2001; Italy in 2006; and Germany sus-
pended it in 2011, even if  constitution retains provisions to reintroduce obligatory military 
service, when necessary.
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cal conflict, advent of  new information and communication technologies 
which made strategists predict a new ‘revolution in military affairs’, and 
not lastly, an increasingly widespread intolerance among the young for the 
burdens and risks of  military service.3
The USA illustrated the seemingly inevitable demise of  conscription 
when the government excluded the possibility of  a draft even as the ‘glob-
al war on terror’ and the direct involvement of  American troops on two 
fronts (in Iraq and Afghanistan) revealed the number of  available soldiers 
to be thoroughly inadequate. In order to satisfy the demand, the Bush ad-
ministration instead chose, firstly, to lower its standard for recruitment into 
the all-volunteer force. In fiscal year 2007, only 79 percent of  the recruits 
had a high-school diploma, compared to a previous average of  90 percent. 
And, in a departure from the regulations in force at the time, the US Army 
admitted a large number of  candidates with criminal records, for a total 
equal to 10 percent of  all recruits.
Secondly, the army increasingly relied on elements of  the National 
Guard and the Reserves – organizations that still embody the ideals of  the 
citizen-soldier, in spite of  the fact that they, too, are based on voluntary 
recruitment. By 2004, these units made up 33 percent of  the US military 
forces deployed in Iraq. The use of  reservists, in particular, rose from 12.7 
million work days in fiscal year 2001, to 61.3 million work days in fiscal year 
2006, involving a total of  almost 600,000 men and women (Commission on 
the National Guard and Reserves 2008; Lynch and Stover 2008).
Thirdly, the Bush administration exponentially increased the prac-
tice of  subcontracting functions to private military corporations, which 
seemed capable of  remedying the vocational crisis while at the same time 
guaranteeing high professional standards. According to governmental data, 
on March 2009, contractors made up 48 percent of  Department of  De-
fense (DOD) workforce in Iraq, and 57 percent in Afghanistan (Schwartz 
2009). This trend was substantially confirmed by Obama administration: 
on March 2011 contractors made up 58 percent of  DOD workforce in Iraq, 
and 48 percent in Afghanistan (Schwartz and Swain 2011); on March 2013, 
62 percent in Afghanistan (Schwartz and Church 2013). The result is that 
“according to government officials and analysts, the military is unable to 
effectively execute many operations, particularly those that are large-scale 
and long-term in nature, without extensive operational contract support. 
Even in short-term operations, contractors can play a variety of  critical 
roles. [...] Given the extensive role of  contractors in military operations, 
3 The body of  literature on the revolution in the military affairs is immense. See, most 
recently, Baylis, Wirtz and Gray 2013.
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many DOD officials and analysts consider contract management a mission-
essential task” (Schwartz and Church 2013: 2).
The combined effect of  voluntary recruitment and outsourcing inevi-
tably results in an emphasis on delegating military functions and, as a con-
sequence, political institutions’ renunciation of  their prerogative both to 
determine the strategic dimensions of  the conflict, and to verify their cor-
rect application. As far as public opinion is concerned, the lack of  a manda-
tory draft as a requirement of  citizenship and the consequent recourse to 
contractors risk accentuating the sense of  estrangement experienced by 
the masses who are excluded from directly participating in war events, and 
often entirely ignorant of  them (circumstances that also characterized the 
relationship between the military and civilians in the past). Among civil-
ians, this estrangement can manifest itself  either as concern about the au-
thoritarian character of  the military institution, or as an excessive faith in 
the ability of  the armed forces to resolve any problem.
After September 11, the risks of  a new militarism were feared by many 
intellectuals in the USA at a moment in which the terrorist menace seemed 
to justify the attribution of  unprecedented prerogatives to the armed forc-
es, even in the domestic sphere, thus foreshadowing the birth of  a new 
model of  a “garrison state” (Lasswell 1941). Among the military forces, 
it tends to be exhibited in frustration over what is perceived as a lack of  
acknowledgement of  the importance (and the danger) of  their mission or, 
vice versa, in an almost aristocratic claim on the right of  membership to a 
body separate from the state.
The entry of  contractors into what, until that moment, had been a fully 
monopolized market of  violence introduces an element of  competitive-
ness that could, over an extended period of  time, have even more signifi-
cant consequences than those outlined here. In the course of  combat, the 
involvement of  private contractors complicates coordination (when it does 
not create actual conflicts of  competencies) between the hierarchical lines 
of  command: in addition to the traditional competition between different 
branches (Army, Air Force and Navy) there is now additional antagonism 
between these and the managers of  the military corporations. The pres-
ence of  soldiers and contractors in the same war theatre – all with different 
functions, responsibilities and rules of  engagement – also produces nega-
tive effects on the cohesion and the morale of  the troops (Avant 2007).
The contention, however, generates effects of  a systemic nature as well, 
f rom the point of  view of  career models for the officer corps, and from 
that of  the military institution as a whole. The first case represents the pos-
sibility of  exploiting the competencies and merits acquired in the public 
sector in order to guarantee career advancement in the private sector. For 
the person directly concerned, shifting from the state military apparatus 
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to the private military corporations can produce undisputed benefits, in 
terms of  both income and social status. But for the state, this mechanism 
represents a cost without any possibility of  a return, and is neither con-
structive nor profitable.
In the second case, the effect is that of  further accentuating the tenden-
cy already observed in Western countries where, starting with the recruit-
ment campaigns, occupational motivations prevail over the institutional: 
the pay, benefits, and the possibility of  specialization in fields useful in the 
civilian life, rather than disinterested service, patriotism, and military val-
ues (Moskos 1977). This strategy might have made sense as an effort to 
widen the recruitment base in the context of  the monopoly of  force held 
by the state. Today, on the contrary, in an arena where private actors can 
issue offers that are far more advantageous than those made by their public 
counterpart, it seems entirely counterproductive.
The structural consequences caused by the abandonment of  the man-
datory draft should be added to those created by the end of  the Cold War 
and the redefinition of  the missions entrusted to state armed forces. A first 
consequence, in fact, was the drastic reduction in the size of  the military 
apparatuses and their radical reorganization into much more agile units, 
which are intended to compensate for reduced firepower with greater ef-
ficiency and the ability to coordinate with other branches of  the military 
made possible by the new communication technologies (Forster 2006; 
Moskos, Williams and Segal 2000). In the early 1990s, scholars in the field 
began predicting the possible consequences of  these structural changes, 
especially with regard to the armed forces of  Western countries (Burk 1994 
and 1998). It was observed, for example, that the requirements for flex-
ibility and speed of  deployment implied the shortening of  the hierarchical 
ladder and a general reduction of  ranks. The overall reshaping and bud-
get cuts, on the other hand, pushed administrations to reserve full-time 
contracts for the fighting personnel for an indefinite time period, while all 
other members of  the military, as well as the civilians hired in the fields 
of  administration, logistics, and other services, were limited to fixed-term 
contracts in accordance with the practices already adopted by private in-
dustries and the civilian sector of  public service (Caforio 2003).
In a short time, among the employees this created an increasing sense 
of  estrangement from the traditional values of  the military institutions, of-
ten compounded by frustration generated by the fact that the salaries they 
received were often inferior to those of  their colleagues hired to work in 
similar positions for private companies: “the implementation of  commer-
cial business practices to improve efficiency, cost-effectiveness, and flexibil-
ity has a marked impact on perceptions of  military employment. Not only 
has it f ragmented military work, but it also appears to have undermined 
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the traditional value system associated with military service based on self-
less service, loyalty, and commitment to the organization” (Heinecken 
2009: 493-494).4
All of  the factors described above can help explain the difficulties in 
recruitment that the armed forces in Western countries occasionally face. 
But, that what matters most, is weakening the ability of  the states, as com-
pared to the competing VNSAs: a) to justify the merits of  violence for 
reaching specific objectives to their own constituencies – a true contradic-
tion in terms for democracies, which they can try to obfuscate by lying to 
their citizens, as repeatedly happened in the USA during the war in Iraq in 
2003 (Brewer 2009); and b) to offer soldiers benefits proportionate to the 
motivation that compels them to kill and even risk their own lives.
With regard to the first point, the comparative advantage of  private 
groups derives from the fact that most of  them can easily demonstrate 
that violence is a necessary, and sometimes sufficient, means to achieve 
their ends. For others, violence can, in fact, represent an end in itself. The 
new coercive non-profit organizations, for example, have no need to resort 
to philosophical theories about the regenerative power of  war, or to refer 
to manuals on guerrilla warfare in order to persuade their men to follow 
them down the path of  revolution or jihad: the objective conditions of  in-
equality and exploitation, and the unbearable daily struggle for survival are 
sufficient motivators. If  the inability to access the political arena and lack 
of  normal channels of  representation deprives individuals of  any hope of  
having their voices heard, and even the possibility of  escape represented by 
emigration is closed to them, then the only remaining option is to gather 
around a leader and be loyal to a cause (Hirschman 1970).
With regard to the second point – the ability to adapt methods of  com-
pensation to the individual motivations of  the soldiers  – private groups 
demonstrate a flexibility unknown to states, employing different combi-
nations of  resources related to status, economic incentives, and coercion 
for each individual case. Private military corporations may rely exclusively 
on economic motivations, having no difficulties in offering their contrac-
tors much higher compensations than state armed forces. Mafia recruiters, 
to make another example, are perfectly capable of  offering their affiliated 
members unexpected possibilities for financial enrichment, but they can 
also take advantage of  members’ loyalty to their minority group which, es-
pecially in a migratory context, may be subjected to conditions of  objective 
4 This climate, moreover, increased the fear of  a possible trade unionization of  the mili-
tary, which, in all countries, has so far has been denied any right to collective representation 
(Bartle and Heinecken 2006).
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exploitation and discrimination.5 And even terrorist organisations, which 
rely primarily on ideological involvement and indoctrination, do not shy 
away from using money to motivate new recruits. On the contrary, com-
petition between rival groups occasionally necessitates the search for funds 
that will finance not only propaganda activities, but also welfare initiatives 
benefitting the community, including improved compensation for combat-
ants. Among other factors, this contributes to explaining the importance of  
the role played by the states that sponsor terrorism (Byman 2005).
Finally, gangs employ three main strategies for recruitment, depend-
ing on the circumstances and the context in which they operate. The first 
is aimed predominantly at the sense of  fraternity, the idea that becoming 
a member of  the group represents a true social achievement despite the 
risks related to the obligation to fight in order to defend the interests and 
reputation of  the gang. The second recruitment technique relies mainly 
on the sense of  belonging to a larger community, and the duty to join a 
group in order to defend the values of  this community. It can therefore 
be adopted only when the gang enjoys a certain legitimacy, or is at least 
tolerated even though it engages in illegal trafficking. The third technique, 
which tends to prevail during periods of  greater conflict for the control of  
a given territory, is based on different forms of  physical and psychological 
coercion which make it possible to increase the ranks in a relatively short 
time ( Jankowski 1991).
Conclusion
The situation described in the previous pages – the privatization of  war 
(as a consequence of  the retreat of  the state), the renewed political pro-
tagonism of  the city (also as conflict zones), and the changing nature of  
militarism (redefined by the entry of  VNSAs) – gave rise to a new era of  
‘permanent global civil war’. Permanent, because war is a daily, almost ordi-
nary, situation for billions of  men and women; which nurtures both politics 
and economy. Global, as opposed to ‘world’, because it is not involving all 
the major powers in the same event at the same time. Unless in the com-
ing years Western democracies officially undertake the dramatic clash of  
civilizations rather too frequently predicted in many circles, we will experi-
ence a continuous, slow loss of  blood and lives on the streets worldwide. 
5 The propensity to foster the feeling of  deprivation as an instrument to legitimise its 
existence among migrant communities has been observed, for example, in the Japanese Yakuza 
(Hill 2003).
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The spread of  VNSAs, their frequent (even obsessive) recourse to violence 
in their everyday activities, as well as their way of  conceiving politics and 
managing the market inevitably will produce an ‘un-sustainable develop-
ment’, in terms of  human ecology – the natural, social and built environ-
ment in which we all live – in a growing number of  countries (and not only 
at the outskirt of  the international system).
Finally, civil means, first of  all, that war is increasingly undertaken by 
actors of  civil society defined, according to Gramsci, as the private sphere 
of  economic relationships. Secondly, civil explicitly refers to the city as the 
preferred sphere for the dynamics of  capital and for coercion. We should 
never forget that we moved in fact “into what has been called the ‘urban 
century’”, and that “there appears to be no end to this headlong urbaniza-
tion of  our world. In 2007, 1.2 million people were added to the world’s ur-
ban population each week. By 2025, according to current estimates, there 
could easily be five billion urbanites, two-third of  whom will live in ‘devel-
oping’ nations. By 2030, Asia alone will have 2.7 billion; the Earth’s cities 
will be packed with 2 billion more people than they accommodate today. 
Twenty years further on, by 2050, fully 75 percent of  the world’s estimated 
9.2 billion people will most likely be living in cities” – and we could also 
easily agree that “new military ideologies of  permanent and boundless war 
are radically intensifying the militarization of  urban life” (Graham 2010: 2 
and 60).6
In 1941, the already cited Harold Lasswell prefigured “a world of  ‘garri-
son states’ – a world in which the specialists on violence are the most pow-
erful group in society. From this point of  view – he added – the trend of  
our time is away from the dominance of  the specialist on bargaining, who 
is the businessman, and toward the supremacy of  the soldier” (Lasswell, 
1941: 455). Today, in the age of  globalization, it seems that the business-
man and the soldier are joining their forces in a new model of  supremacy, 
intended to produce a new world of  ‘garrison cities’: a strange and pecu-
liar mixture of  gated communities necessarily reserved for a high-income 
population  – controlled-access residential areas, often bordered by walls 
or fences, protected by sophisticated video-surveillance systems and by 
private police, and supplied with all services (Atkinson and Blandy 2006; 
6 It is not at all fortuitous that police forces are increasingly undergoing a process of  mili-
tarisation through the creation of  special units which seek to emulate elite corps of  the armed 
forces in both training and weaponry. For example, in the US, the Police Paramilitary Units 
(PPU) or Special Weapons and Tactics Teams (SWAT), directly modelled on the Navy Seals, 
have become widespread in the last few decades: in 1995, 89 percent of  all police departments 
located in communities with over 50,000 inhabitants had one of  these teams, which represents 
a doubling of  the 1980 figures (Kraska 2001). Similar units appeared in some European coun-
tries, such as Germany and Italy, in the 1970s, mainly to combat terrorism.
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Bagaeen and Uduku 2010) – and slums for the unprivileged people – whose 
informal and engulfing architecture is the realm of  organized crime and 
gangs (Davis M. 2006).
And the state is reinforcing this trend, dismantling the welfare, and de-
volving (or, directly, outsourcing) its monopoly of  legitimate force to private 
actors; and adopting a new, residual mode of  domination – what Bauman 
defines as “mutually assured vulnerability”, based on the beefing up and dra-
matization of  “official fear” (mainly of  terrorism). In USA, for example, CIA 
and FBI are launching alerts on possible attacks, and building up tension; but 
“this is how the popular demand for the emaciated version of  state power 
that has successively withdrawn (or has been banished) from most of  its past 
protective functions, is rebuilt on a new foundation – personal vulnerabil-
ity and personal safety, instead of  social vulnerability and social protection” 
(Bauman 2004: 119). This, at least, what happens in the domestic domain.
At the global level, we are experiencing the subversion of  one of  the 
most renowned theories of  International Relations: the hegemonic stabil-
ity. This theory stated, in fact, that to limit the discord and the war, coop-
eration is necessary, and a politics of  reciprocal adaptation favored by the 
‘brokerage’ of  an hegemonic power (Keohane 1984). The current paradox, 
on the contrary, is that all the current (and prospective) hegemonic powers 
seem devoted to nurture instability, fostering the expansion of  the global 
market of  organized violence.
Western (and most developed) democratic countries, in particular, are 
playing the game of  the ‘enemy at the gates’, even if  they produce, con-
trol and sell most of  the world armaments. In 2016, military expenditures 
accounted for a total of  1,686 billion dollars; 626 of  which spent by USA, 
and 334 by Europe. But the most relevant data is related to arm exports: 
between 2012 and 2016, USA accounted for 33 percent, and Europe for 21.7 
percent – a total of  54.7 that, adding also Russia and China, amounts to 83.9 
percent (SIPRI 2018).7
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